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THE PLAIN (OR NOT SO PLAIN) VIEW DOCTRINE:
APPLYING THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO DIGITAL
SEIZURES
Kate Brueggemann Ward*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE POWER OF THE DIGITAL WORLD AND THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE
The power of the digital world is truly transformative. Technological
innovation reaches virtually every aspect of human life—from the way
in which individuals communicate, to how they gather and store
information, to how they purchase goods. The reach of the digital world
extends so far that both business and social norms have been forever
altered as a result.
Further evidence of the enormous power of the digital world rests in
the amazing storage capacity of a single computer. Imagine a
warehouse full of documents. How many documents do you think it can
hold? One hundred thousand? Two hundred thousand? Now compare
that large physical space to the digital capacity to store millions of
documents. This 150 kilobytes document currently being read was
opened on a computer with 350 gigabytes of memory; room enough for
thirty-six million documents like this one.
Now imagine searching for a few dozen sensitive documents in the
mass of thirty-six million documents, which were categorized, placed,
and named, sometimes intentionally mislabeled, by another person. This
type of challenge is frequently presented when police search and seize
digital media. When conducting a search of a suspect’s computer for
evidence of a particular crime, investigators are confronted with the task
of locating this evidence amidst millions of items. Inevitably during this
type of search, investigators will come across items they were not
initially looking for. These items can end up being evidence of other
crimes. The question becomes, how should the courts deal with this
other evidence?
This Comment analyzes the competing federal circuit court
interpretations of the plain view doctrine as applied to Fourth
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Amendment searches and seizures of digital media. Part II provides
background of the Fourth Amendment and the plain view doctrine as
well as the various legal conceptions of electronic data as interpreted by
scholars and the courts.
Part III examines three competing
interpretations of the application of the plain view doctrine to digital
searches and seizures applied by the four circuit courts that have
addressed the issue. Part IV discusses the benefits and problems
associated with each analytical approach. Part IV also concludes that
the solution is “plain” and advocates applying the traditional objective
approach to the plain view doctrine to Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution represents
the fundamental value of privacy and freedom from unwarranted
intrusions by the government. Yet even such a sweeping protection has
its limits. One such limit is the plain view doctrine. The plain view
doctrine seeks to balance a citizen’s interests in privacy and freedom
from intrusive searches and the government’s interest in effective law
enforcement when officers come across incriminating evidence of one
crime while searching for evidence of another. This doctrine creates
unique problems when applied to the digital world.
A. Fourth Amendment – Generally
The Fourth Amendment protects against the overarching police
power, 1 specifically providing that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 2

Among the myriad of protections arising out of the Fourth
Amendment is the exclusionary rule, which guarantees the rights of the
Fourth Amendment by preventing the admission in criminal proceedings

1. Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and The Case For the Courts, 10
YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 124 (2007) (explaining that the development of the Fourth Amendment was a
reaction to the general warrants and writs of assistance which permitted the British to search and seize
without requiring individualized suspicion or descriptions of the persons or items to be seized).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of inappropriately obtained evidence. 3 Thus, evidence obtained without
warrant or without probable cause will be inadmissible against a
defendant during trial proceedings. The United States Supreme Court
expanded the protections of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United
States. 4 In Katz, the Court explained that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people—and not simply ‘areas,’” thus extending the Fourth
Amendment’s protections beyond mere physical trespass. 5 After Katz,
courts must now consider whether a person has both a subjective and
objective expectation of privacy, regardless of whether physical trespass
occurred. 6 As Justice Stevens explained, “[t]he prohibition against
general searches and general warrants serves primarily as a protection
against unjustified intrusions on privacy.” 7
Deterrence is the Court’s primary motive in excluding evidence
obtained without a warrant or without probable cause. 8 The Court
excludes such evidence in the hope of deterring investigators and the
police from obtaining evidence in an unconstitutional manner. 9
Therefore, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes multiple
exceptions to the exclusionary rule when the primary purpose of
deterrence would not be served by such a restriction. Some of these
exceptions include inevitable discovery, 10 good faith, 11 independent
source, 12 exigent searches, 13 reasonable mistake, 14 and, the focus of this
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Id. at 353.
6. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he rule that has emerged from our prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).
7. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990).
8. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648, 655 (incorporating the exclusionary rule to the states).
9. Id. The question of whether the deterrence rationale is a viable means of ensuring the
privacy of individuals are fully provided for is beyond the scope of this Comment.
10. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (noting that although a Fourth Amendment violation
occurred, the evidence was admitted because police officers obtained legitimate leads in addition to the
violation, which led them to the evidence).
11. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Herring v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009) (noting that the exclusionary rule is meant to deter the cop on the
beat, thus when a mistake is made that is not the fault of the cop on the beat, the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule applies).
12. Murray v United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (explaining that although the evidence was
obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, it would have been discovered anyway through
another source, such as, if a search party was going through the woods, they would have eventually
found the cabin, which had been entered without a warrant).
13. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that in an emergency situation, police may
enter a home without a warrant or probable cause).
14. Maryland. v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (noting that reasonable mistake permits
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Comment, the plain view doctrine.
B. The Plain View Doctrine
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 15 the Supreme Court provided its first
significant discussion of the plain view doctrine. In his plurality
opinion, Justice Stewart provided an example of when the plain view
doctrine would apply; specifically he indicated that it would apply when
the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects and
in the course of that search comes across some other article of
incriminating character. 16 In such a situation, the Supreme Court found
that probable cause was unnecessary to seize evidence not described in
the warrant because the evidence was in “plain view.” 17 The plurality
held that for evidence not described in the warrant to be in “plain view,”
an officer must be in a lawful vantage point of such evidence, 18 must
have a lawful right of access to the evidence itself, 19 and the object’s
incriminating character must be immediately apparent to the officer. 20
The Court subsequently reaffirmed these requirements. 21 Justice
Stewart explained, once a lawful search is in progress it would be a
“needless inconvenience” and “sometimes dangerous—to the evidence
or to the police themselves”—for officers to ignore incriminating
evidence in plain view. 22
For officers to be in a lawful vantage point of evidence under the
plain view doctrine, they must not have violated the Fourth Amendment
in arriving at the place where the object can be plainly viewed. 23 In
other words, the officers must have a warrant or some other recognized
Fourth Amendment exception permitting their presence in the location
from which the unspecified evidence is plainly viewed. 24 To justify a
admissibility of evidence if the police are wrong about their actions, however, if the circumstances are
not so bizarre that some officer of minimal intelligence could have made the mistake, the evidence is
admissible).
15. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
16. Id. at 465.
17. Id. at 465–66 (Emphasis was added to highlight that the plain view doctrine applies to the
seizure of items not searches. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure
would involve any invasion of privacy, and therefore constitutes no violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
18. Id. at 465.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
22. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468.
23. Horton, 496 U.S. at 135–36.
24. Id. at 139.
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seizure of evidence not mentioned in a warrant, the plain view doctrine
cannot take effect until a search is already in progress. 25
Lawful access to the evidence requires officers, when conducting a
search, to adhere to the scope of the warrant or to rely on a Fourth
Amendment exception, which either permits a search or permits
extending a search; furthermore, the officer’s must stop the search once
the items described in the warrant are discovered. 26 For example,
officers may not trespass on a suspect’s property to obtain evidence in
plain view without obtaining a warrant or confronting a situation in
which a Fourth Amendment exception applies. 27
To avoid an expansion of the plain view doctrine as a justification for
general exploratory searches “from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges,” the incriminating character of
the evidence seized must be immediately apparent to the investigating
officer. 28 In Arizona v. Hicks, the Court established that an investigating
officer must have probable cause upon initial sight to believe that the
evidence is linked to a crime in order to justify its seizure under the plain
view doctrine. 29 Hicks involved an officer, who pursuant to an exigency
search 30 of an apartment, moved expensive stereo equipment to obtain
its serial numbers, which were later were used to prove that the
equipment was stolen. 31 The Court found this evidence inadmissible
and the plain view doctrine inapplicable because the stereo equipment
lacked incriminating character upon sight. 32 Although the officer
maintained he had a reasonable suspicion that the equipment was stolen,
because it looked out of place in the small apartment, the Court held the
plain view doctrine requires that the higher standard of probable cause to
be met. 33
Initially, the Court maintained inadvertence as a requirement under
the plain view doctrine. 34 By this standard, the plurality in Coolidge
maintained officers executing a search warrant could not have
knowledge that they may come across evidence unspecified in the

25. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467.
26. 79 C.J.S. SEARCHES § 273 (2010).
27. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465–66).
28. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
29. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987).
30. In an emergency situation, an officer may enter a residence to check out the situation. See,
e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
31. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
32. Id. at 322.
33. Id. at 326.
34. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
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warrant. 35 However, in Horton, the Court explicitly overruled itself and
held the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless seizures of
evidence of a crime in plain view, even if the discovery of the evidence
was not inadvertent on the part of the police officer. 36
In sum, to justify a seizure under the plain view doctrine each of the
three previously described elements must be met. To use the example
described in Part I to demonstrate the application of the plain view
doctrine, imagine a judge issues a warrant to search an entire warehouse
for a document relating to the crime of extortion. As police search for
this document, they discover boxes filled with cocaine. Under the plain
view doctrine, the cocaine is admissible as evidence of drug trafficking.
The police met the lawful vantage point requirement because the warrant
permitted them to search the warehouse. The search of the boxes was
within the scope of the warrant because boxes reasonably contain
documents, so the officers had lawful access to the cocaine itself.
Finally, the incriminating nature of the cocaine is immediately apparent
because it is always illegal to possess cocaine.
C. Legal Conceptions of Electronic Data and Digital Media
While the plain view doctrine is fairly well-settled, its use becomes
muddled when it is applied to the unique challenges of the digital world.
The Court’s language explains the plain view doctrine in terms of
physical space, whereas evidence on a computer is found in virtual
space. A court’s application of the plain view doctrine to electronic data
and digital media evidence depends on how a court actually views a
digital search and seizure. There are two principle conceptions of
electronic data stored on computers and digital devices. 37 One view
asserts that the traditional Fourth Amendment principles apply because a
computer is a container, and the data in electronic storage are merely

35. Id.
36. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1990). The Court found two flaws in the
inadvertence requirement: (1) Objective standards are better for evaluating the actions of law
enforcement as opposed to a subjective state of mind because if an officer has a valid warrant to search
for one item and merely a suspicion concerning the second, there is no reason why that suspicion should
immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a lawful search for the first. (2) No
additional Fourth Amendment interest is served by requiring that the discovery of the evidence be
ignored because the interests of the Fourth Amendment are already served by the requirements that no
warrant issue unless it particularly describes the place and persons to be searched and seized. If the
scope of the search exceeds the terms of the warrant, the subsequent seizure is constitutionally invalid.
Id.
37. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A
Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 196 (2005).
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forms of documents. 38 The other view asserts that data searches are
unique thus requiring unique procedures. 39
1. Data as Documents
Some courts analogize computers and digital storage devices as
closed containers or file cabinets. 40 The physical computer is a
container, and all electronic data stored therein are fairly searchable if
agents have a valid warrant to search the device; furthermore, when
those contents are exposed they are in plain view and subject to
seizure. 41 This view asserts that there is no distinction between records
kept electronically and those kept in paper form. 42 Under this approach,
courts look to traditional Fourth Amendment means to limit the scope of
document searches. 43 Therefore, the plain view doctrine applies.
2. Data as Unique
For Fourth Amendment analysis, many scholars consider data
searches and seizures unique and find the “closed container” approach to
be an oversimplification of the complexities involved in this area of law.
For one thing, the sheer volume of storage space in a computer
exponentially outmatches anything in a typical storage container. 44
Computers, unlike file cabinets, hold information touching on many
aspects of life, all conveniently stored in one small location. 45
Moreover, individuals put a wide variety of information on their
computers ranging from pictures, to correspondence, to financial
records. 46 Typical containers or document files are much more limited
in what types of information they contain. Based on this, applying the
plain view doctrine to searches and seizures of data on a computer or
digital device allows police officers to access a much larger amount of
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Trepel, supra note 1, at 126.
Id.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 126–27.
RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital Evidence, 12
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007) (“The School of Information Management and Systems
at the University of California, Berkeley estimates that about five exabytes of new information, which is
equivalent to 37,000 times the amount of information in the Library of Congress book collections, was
created in 2002 alone.”).
45. David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer
Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 867 (2005).
46. Chang, supra note 44, at 35.
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information than with traditional searches and seizures.
In addition, some scholars argue that the traditional application of the
plain view doctrine is predicated on the “empirical concept of visual
observation” and note that sight in the physical world is unambiguous,
but in the computer world, searches and seizures are method-specific. 47
For example, to view the contents of the file, the file must be opened, so
there is an intermediary step before the contents of the file come into
view. This view cannot be said to be “plain” because it was not
immediately apparent to the viewer. Therefore, digital searches are
more like unlocking and opening a box, which requires an officer to
have the implements to unlock and then open the box, thus falling
outside the scope of the plain view doctrine. 48 Also, unlike physical
property, police cannot see digital property directly.49 When police look
at a hard drive, they cannot interpret the code without the assistance of a
machine that reads the digital property storage device and a program that
translates the digital property into a perceivable form that may not
represent the true nature of the digital property. 50
Under this interpretation, for the plain view doctrine to apply, the
government must meet the three-part test to comply with the Fourth
Amendment. The federal circuit courts disagree regarding which
conceptualization of digital storage is the more appropriate model to
determine the plain view doctrine’s application to electronic data and
digital media evidence. This shapes the outcome of their holdings
involving seizure of electronic evidence justified by the government
under the plain view doctrine.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: APPLYING SEPARATE ANALYTICAL APPROACHES
TO THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Courts struggle with the application of the plain view doctrine to
seizure of data and electronic files discovered during searches of
computers and other digital devices. Digital media presents challenges
distinguishable from traditional physical searches because evidence
discovered electronically is discovered in a non-physical world. Courts
have yet to successfully apply the complications of the digital world to a
once fixed concept of space. As a result, the four circuit courts that have
addressed this issue have split into three distinct analytical approaches.
47. Susan W. Brenner and Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some
Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 94 (2002).
48. Id.
49. Chang, supra note 44, at 36.
50. Id.
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A. Traditional Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Objective
Application of the Plain View Doctrine
In United States v. Williams, 51 the Fourth Circuit used an objective
approach to apply the plain view doctrine to the seizure of child
pornography discovered during the execution of a warrant for a separate
crime. 52 The court analogized the search of the computer to a search of
a file cabinet with a large number of documents and indicated that there
was no reason to depart from the rules that apply to a file cabinet when
conducting a computer or digital device search. 53 Under this approach,
the traditional search and seizure rules apply to computer and digital
media searches and seizures.
The police in Williams conducted an investigation regarding several
e-mails sent to the Fairfax Baptist Temple threatening rape and bodily
injury to several named boys who attended the temple. 54 Once the
investigation uncovered the identity of the individual who the e-mail
account was registered to, a warrant was issued permitting the police to
search the contents of the defendant’s computer systems, digital storage
media, videotapes, video tape recorders, and instrumentalities in
connection with the offenses of harassment by computer and threats of
death of bodily injury. 55 Pursuant to this search warrant, officers opened
deleted files on the various media and found “many deleted images of
young male erotica.” 56 Officers also opened a DVD labeled, “Virus
Shield, Quaranteed [sic] Files, Destroy.” 57 The DVD contained
thousands of images in “thumbnail view” of minor boys; thirty-nine of
the images constituted child pornography. 58
The defendant argued that the search for and seizure of child
pornography violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures because the warrant did not authorize the search
and seizure of child pornography and because the search did not fall
within any recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. 59 Specifically, the defendant argued that the plain view

51. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595 (2010).
52. See generally id.
53. Id. at 523.
54. Id. at 514–15.
55. Id. at 515–16.
56. Id. at 516.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 517, 518. The defendant relied on an article by Professor Orin Kerr, which advocates
for a new approach to the plain view doctrine in digital searches and seizures. See Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 513 (2005).
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exception to the warrant requirement could not be applied in the context
of computer searches unless the files sought to be seized pursuant to the
warrant were discovered inadvertently. 60 The defendant questioned the
validity of the search as a deliberate extension of the search warrant
beyond its expressed bounds. 61 Notably, the investigating officer
testified that his experience as a detective informed his judgment on the
propensity for perpetrators like the defendant to possess child
pornography. 62 The defendant argued that reliance on this experience
was not inadvertent, but instead deliberate. 63 The warrant, however, did
not mention the crime of child pornography. 64 The court noted the
nuance of the defendant’s argument is that traditional Fourth
Amendment rules should not apply “[s]ince computers can hold so much
information, touching on virtually every aspect of a person’s life, the
potential for invasion of privacy in a search of electronic evidence is
significantly greater than in the context of a non-computer search.” 65
The Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that inadvertence on the part of
the officers plays any role in determining whether the seizure of
particular evidence falls within the scope of the plain view exception to
the warrant requirement regarding electronic seizures or other types of
seizure. 66 The court explained that Supreme Court jurisprudence
maintains a well-established principle that “the scope of a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant is defined objectively by the terms of
the warrant and the evidence sought, not by the subjective motivations of
an officer.” 67 Inadvertence improperly focuses on the subjective
motivations of the officer instead of actually applying the plain view
doctrine as laid out by the Supreme Court. 68
To apply this doctrine to computer and electronic data searches, the
Fourth Circuit began by accepting the premise that, in this case, the
warrant implicitly authorized officers to open each file on the computer
to view its contents, at least cursorily, to determine if the file fell within

60. Id. at 518 (emphasis added). The defendant relied on United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268
(10th Cir. 1999), which is discussed at length in Part III(b).
61. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595
(2010).
62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 518.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 517.
66. Id. at 522–23.
67. Id. at 522 (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
68. Id. at 522–23 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)).
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the scope of the warrant’s authority. 69 For a computer or other digital
device to be effectively searched, the search cannot be limited to only
reviewing the files’ designation or labeling because files can be easily
manipulated to hide their substance. 70 In other words, a criminal will
not label his computers files “evidence-of-crime.doc.” Accepting that a
computer or digital device search pursuant to a warrant permits cursory
review of each file on said device, the Fourth Circuit explained that the
criteria for the plain view doctrine was satisfied:
First, an officer who has legal possession of the computer and electronic
media and a legal right to conduct a search of it is “law fully [sic] present
at the place from which evidence can be viewed,” . . . . Second, the
officer, who is authorized to search the computer and electronic media for
evidence of a crime and who is therefore legally authorized to open and
view all its files, at least cursorily, to determine whether any one falls
within the terms of the warrant, has “a lawful right of access” to all files,
albeit only momentarily. And third, when the officer then comes upon
child pornography, it becomes “immediately apparent” that its possession
by the computer’s owner is illegal and incriminating. 71

The Fourth Circuit held that any child pornography on the computer or
electronic media may be seized under the plain view exception.72 In
addition, the court also made broader statements in dicta regarding
electronic data searches and seizures, expounding on the reasoning
behind its holding and treatment of electronic searches and seizures.
The Fourth Circuit maintained that searches and seizures of electronic
files, despite the large amount of information contained on such media,
do not require special treatment under the Fourth Amendment. 73
B. The “Inadvertence” Standard: The Subjective Application of the
Plain View Doctrine
Two circuits seemingly resurrected the Coolidge standard by adopting
a subjective application of the plain view exception and mandating
inadvertent discovery of the evidence said to be in plain view. These
circuits expressed concern with police officers subverting probable
cause and warrant requirements. 74 Both circuits operate under the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
(2010).

Id. at 523.
Id. at 522.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 511, 522.
United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6
J-BRUEGGEMAN

1174

8/3/2011 11:02:06 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

premise that digital searches and seizures are different from traditional
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and mandate additional requirements
to satisfy the plain view doctrine.
1. The Seventh Circuit
Decided just one day after United States v. Williams, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Mann elected to analyze the digital media as
unique and held the plain view doctrine can only apply if the evidence is
discovered inadvertently, which requires examining the subjective
intentions of the officer. 75 Similar to Williams, Mann involved a case
where child pornography was discovered during the execution of a
warrant for a separate crime. Officers obtained a warrant to search the
defendant’s computers and hard drives for images of voyeurism. 76 The
detective on the case used software known as a “forensic tool kit” (FTK)
to catalogue the images on the computer into a viewable format, as well
as a “known file filter” (KFF) which flags those files identifiable from a
library of known files previously submitted by law enforcement—most
of which are images of child pornography. 77 Through the search of the
computers, the detective discovered evidence of voyeurism and child
pornography. 78 The defendant argued that the detective’s search was an
impermissibly general search of his computers for crimes unrelated to
the crime of voyeurism. 79
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held the plain view
exception applied to the evidence of child pornography discovered
during the execution of the voyeurism search warrant; however, unlike
the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit relied on the subjective intentions
of the officer to provide legitimacy to the plain view discoveries of child
pornography. 80 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis from the same
premise as the Fourth Circuit: in order to conduct a thorough search
pursuant to the warrant, the officer conducting the search had to view all

75. Id. at 784.
76. Id. at 780–81.
77. Id. at 781.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 784. The court explained that the detective’s focus on finding images related to
voyeurism as opposed to images of child pornography validated the seizure of the child pornography
images under the plain view exception. As a point of comparison, the court contrasted this with a
detective who had abandoned his initial search for drug-related evidence once he discovered child
pornography and began a search for child pornography exclusively. See Carey v. United States, 172
F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999).
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the digital files. 81 But the Seventh Circuit added inadvertence as a
criterion for applying the plain view doctrine. The court explained the
officer’s actions were justified under the plain view exception because at
no time did he stray from his initial search for evidence of voyeurism
while searching the computer. 82 This determination was based upon the
subjective intentions of the officer. Although the detective found child
pornography, he did not then abandon his search for evidence of
voyeurism and then look for child pornography; therefore, despite
coming into plain view, his intent was not to find child pornography. 83
The Seventh Circuit more explicitly highlighted the inadvertence
requirement in its analysis of the four flagged “KFF Alert Files,” which
were deemed inadmissible. 84 The court explained once the software had
flagged those files, the detective reviewing the files knew or should have
known that files in a database of known child pornography images
would be outside the scope of a warrant issued to search for evidence of
voyeurism. 85
Therefore, in the Seventh Circuit, for the plain view doctrine to apply,
the evidence in question must have been discovered inadvertently.
Inadvertence is determined by looking at the subjective intentions of the
officer conducting the search. While admitting the evidence of child
pornography under the plain view exception, the court offered a caveat
that it would have been preferable for the officer to stop his search after
stumbling upon the child pornography and request a separate warrant. 86
2. The Tenth Circuit
Presented with another factual scenario involving the seizure of
images of child pornography while executing a search warrant for a
separate crime, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Carey, 87 held that
the images were not in plain view and exceeded the scope of the
warrant. 88 In Carey, police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s
81. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525
(2010).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added to highlight the court’s focus on the subjective intentions of the
detective).
86. Id. at 786.
87. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
88. The court suggested in this case that it was not addressing the question of what constitutes
“plain view” in the context of computer files, however, the court’s language and holding clearly
implicate the plain view doctrine in its analysis. Further, other courts’ subsequent reliance on Carey
when discussing the plain view doctrine indicates that its reasoning and holding involve the plain view
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computer files for names, telephone numbers, ledgers, receipts,
addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and
distribution of controlled substances. 89 During the search, the detective
on the case discovered “JPEG” files, which after downloading and
opening, he discovered contained images of child pornography. 90
The court explained that the plain view argument was not available
because it was “the contents of the files and not the files themselves
which were seized.” 91 According to the court, although it was the file’s
contents that were seized, it was only the file’s label, and not is contents,
that were actually in plain view. 92 The court conceded that the detective
could not at first distinguish between files holding evidence of drug
dealing and evidence of child pornography, 93 and therefore, he did not
expect to find child pornography. 94 However, each time he opened a
subsequent JPEG file, he expected to find child pornography and not
material related to drugs. 95 The court found this lack of inadvertence
fatal to the application of the plain view doctrine to the images
discovered after the initial discovery because the detective clearly knew
he was acting without judicial authority.96 As in the Seventh Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit examined the subjective intentions of the officer
conducting the search.
In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit explained that obtaining a
second search warrant could rectify the problem in Carey. 97 This means
once an officer opens a file and evidence of a crime not mentioned in the
initial warrant comes into plain view, that officer must stop the search
and seek a new warrant. 98
Carey is cited frequently in both Williams and Mann. In Williams, the
Fourth Circuit expressly disagreed with the inadvertence holding in
Carey, stating:
While Williams relies accurately on Carey, which effectively imposes
an “inadvertence” requirement, such a conclusion is inconsistent with
doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 518 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
595 (2010).; Mann, 592 F.3d at 783.
89. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272–73.
90. Id. at 1271.
91. Id. at 1273.
92. Id. at 1275.
93. Id. at 1273 (“Indeed, he had to open the first JPG file and examine its contents to determine
what the file contained.”).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009).
98. Id. at 1083.
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Horton. Inadvertence focuses incorrectly on the subjective motivations of
the officer in conducting the search and not on the objective
determination of whether the search is authorized by the warrant or a
valid exception to the warrant requirement. 99

In addition, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the file cabinet analogy the
Tenth Circuit found inadequate. In Carey, the Tenth Circuit explained
that because electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and
variety of information, relying on analogies to closed containers or file
cabinets may lead courts to oversimplify a complex area of the Fourth
Amendment. 100 In contrast, Mann relies on Carey as authority to justify
its decision. 101
C. Independent Redaction and Review: The Plain View Doctrine Does
Not Apply
Instead of attempting to apply the plain view exception to computer
and digital searches and seizures, the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected
using the plain view exception for these types of searches and seizures
and instead developed an entirely different standard of evaluation. In
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., the Ninth Circuit
rejected the government’s attempt to justify its seizure of the digitally
stored drug-testing records for hundreds of Major League Baseball
players and indicated that the government must foreswear reliance on
the plain view doctrine applied to digital seizures altogether. 102 This
case was revised and superseded in a rehearing en banc by the Ninth
Circuit. 103 However, the concurring opinion, joined by five judges,
adopted the same analysis when attempting to resolve the problems of
digital seizures, 104 and the court’s per curium opinion, while failing to
identify a solution, maintained the same analysis regarding the problems
of digital seizure. 105 Therefore, the analytical approach to the plain view
99. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595
(2010). See also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
100. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (citing Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and
Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 104 (1994)).
101. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 783–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (contrasting the defendant’s
actions with the actions of the defendant in Carey and finding the inadvertence standard met), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010).
102. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009), revised
and superseded by United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
103. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1162.
104. Id. at 1178. The concurrence adopts this language verbatim when explaining the procedure
that should be followed regarding digital evidence. The concurrence explains that because this issue is
likely to arise again, guidance regarding how to deal with electronic sources is useful.
105. See id. at 1171–75. The revising court lays out the problem of digital searches verbatim as
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doctrine used by the Ninth Circuit remains viable and is important when
considering how the plain view doctrine should apply to the seizure of
digital evidence.
The warrant authorized the seizure of only ten players’ drug-testing
records, but officers used this warrant to seize and examine the records
for hundreds of players. 106 The government sought to justify this
seizure under the plain view doctrine. 107 The court determined that the
problem with searches and seizures of computer and digital devices is
there is no way to know exactly what a file contains unless the file is
opened and its contents revealed. 108 Specifically, necessary efforts to
locate particular files requires examining a great many other files to
exclude the possibility that the sought-after data is concealed in those
other files. 109 Once a file is examined, however, the government may
claim that the contents are in plain view, and if incriminating, may keep
it, which allows for over-seizing. 110 In order to solve this problem, the
Ninth Circuit eliminated the plain view doctrine in cases involving
digital evidence and adopted a special standard. 111 Under the Ninth
Circuit’s special standard, when the government wishes to obtain a
warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium
in searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for
evidence could result in the seizure of a computer, magistrate judges
must observe the following:
1. [They] should insist that the government waive reliance upon the
plain view doctrine . . . .
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized
personnel or an independent third party. If the segregation is to be done
by government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the
investigators any information other than that which is the target of the
warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of
destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information
in other judicial fora.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover
only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that
this court, however, does not lay out the specific procedures to follow when dealing with digital
evidence.
106. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 993.
107. Id. at 997.
108. Id. at 1004.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1004–05. See also, Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1172.
111. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 998.
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information may be examined by the case agents.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully
possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate
informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. 112

“Non-reliance” on the plain view doctrine means that should the
government come upon evidence of one crime while executing a warrant
for a separate crime, they cannot seize evidence because the plain view
exception is unavailable. The court explained that if the government
refuses to waive reliance on the plain view doctrine, the magistrate judge
should order that the seizable and non-seizable data as described by the
warrant be separated by an independent third party under the supervision
of the court or should deny the warrant altogether. 113
In sum, the circuit courts cannot agree on how to legally
conceptualize digital data or on the legal application of the Fourth
Amendment to that data. The Fourth Circuit applied the plain view
doctrine as is to digital seizures. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits added
a subjective inadvertence requirement to the plain view doctrines threeprong test. The Ninth Circuit does not rely on the plain view doctrine
whatsoever in digital seizures.
IV. DISCUSSION: A “PLAIN” EVALUATION OF EACH APPROACH
The circuit split described above demonstrates the uncertainty
encountered when considering traditional Fourth Amendment principles
in the electronic search and seizure context. The courts are clearly
grappling with how the Fourth Amendment applies in the technological
world, and the plain view doctrine creates a particular problem. The
solution to the problem of the plain view doctrine requires courts to
determine whether computer and digital device searches are
distinguishable from traditional searches, and how to apply the Fourth
Amendment rules. The three separate approaches developed by the
federal circuit courts each provide solutions to the problems associated
with the plain view doctrine applied to the digital world and raise
important concerns that must be considered before either approach is
endorsed. This Comment concludes that the objective approach,
employed by the Fourth Circuit, best serves the goals of the Fourth
Amendment by adequately addressing privacy interests and balancing
those interests with law enforcement and crime control interests.

112. Id. at 1006 (internal citations omitted). See also Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d
at 1178 (J. Kozinki, concurring).
113. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 998.
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A. Traditional Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Endorsed
The solution to the computer search and seizure problems seems
somewhat elusive; however, the traditional application of the plain view
doctrine furthers both crime control goals and privacy interests. This
objective approach, as applied by the Fourth Circuit in Williams, offers
the best solution to the quandaries of digital and electronic searches.
Williams exemplifies that the plain view doctrine, which is wellestablished within the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent,
can be seamlessly applied to the search and seizure of computers as well
as other digital and electronic devises.
The objective approach is well grounded in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court recognizes that the Fourth
Amendment protects “intangible as well as tangible evidence.” 114
Extending this sentiment to the seizure of digital data, the intangible
nature of computer data does not affect its analysis under the Fourth
Amendment. 115 Once a court permits the search of a computer or other
digital device through a warrant, the contents of that computer are
searchable. Although the courts addressing this issue disagree regarding
the application of the plain view doctrine to computer searches, each
court accepts the necessity and legality in opening all files on the
specified computer to determine its contents for purpose of a search
warrant. 116 When searching for documents, the Supreme Court
recognizes that the object of a search determines its permissible scope
and as a result, some “innocuous documents” must be viewed in order to
determine whether those documents can be seized pursuant to the
warrant. 117 Similarly, files on a computer or digital device require a
cursory view to determine their contents. To be effective, a search of a
computer cannot be limited to reviewing only the file’s designation or
label because the designation or label of digital files can be easily
manipulated to hide the file’s substance. 118 Once this premise is
accepted, a court can readily apply the three criterion of the plain view
doctrine to data seizures with relative ease as the Fourth Circuit did in
Williams.
As laid out in Williams, in order to seize data evidence under the plain
114. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967).
115. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computer and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 75, 81 (1994).
116. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595
(2010); United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525 (2010);
Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 579 F.3d at 999.
117. Ziff, supra note 45, at 862 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976)).
118. Williams, 592 F.3d at 522.
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view doctrine, an officer must: (1) legally possess the computer or
digital media device through the execution of a warrant; (2) this legal
possession puts the officer in a position to lawfully view all the files on
the computer; and (3) if an officer discovers evidence of another crime,
he may seize it if its incriminating nature is readily apparent. 119 This
mirrors the three criterion endorsed by the Supreme Court when
applying the traditional plain view doctrine: (1) lawful vantage point; (2)
lawful access; and (3) the incriminating character of the evidence must
be immediately apparent. 120 Under this approach, courts are not
required to break precedent covering non-digital property, and existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence need not be altered. 121
The
Department of Justice Guidelines currently suggest this approach. 122
The relative legal and factual ease in applying this approach makes its
use very attractive to the courts.
These traditional elements of the plain view doctrine adequately
promote law enforcement in addition to protecting privacy interests.
Under the traditional application of the plain view doctrine, a search of a
specified area must be legitimate and already in progress to justify the
seizure of an item in plain view. 123 As explained in Williams, to obtain
the computer in the first place, an investigating officer must obtain a
warrant. 124 Thus, the justifications for the warrant will be subject to the
scrutiny of a judicial officer in order to determine if probable cause
exists. Should a warrant be issued to search a computer, officers
searching would be in a “lawful vantage point” to view its contents.
This is no different from a traditional application of the plain view
doctrine. 125 Once officers meet this first criterion and obtain legal
possession, they may lawfully view all the files on the computer as
previously discussed, thus meeting the lawful access requirement.
These first two criteria, if met, provide the power to conduct a thorough
search; however, the scope of this power is distinctly limited by the third
criteria.
The “immediately apparent” criterion provides the most protection for
privacy interests; furthermore, courts and scholars often fail to recognize
its powerful protection when discussing data and file seizure. 126 To
119. Id.
120. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
121. Chang, supra note 44, at 60.
122. Id.
123. Horton, 496 U.S. at 135.
124. Id. at 142 n.11 (holding that, for the plain view doctrine to apply, an officer must be acting
within the scope of a warrant or be acting within the scope of another Fourth Amendment exception).
125. See supra Part II.
126. Scholarly works as well as the court in Comprehensive Drug Testing fail adequately consider
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satisfy this criterion, the incriminating nature of the file viewed must be
immediately apparent to be seizeable, and therefore, an officer can only
open a file to the extent necessary to determine that it is not
mislabeled. 127 As the Williams court explained, officers are only
permitted a “cursory” view of each file. 128 This approach to data
seizures is consistent with what the Supreme Court permits in traditional
seizures. In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court decided a case
involving a police officer who observed expensive stereo equipment
during an exigency search. 129 The officer moved the equipment to take
down the serial number, and upon running the number, discovered it was
stolen. 130 The Court held this evidence inadmissible, 131 indicating that
the plain view doctrine was unavailable because the incriminating nature
of the stereo system was not readily apparent, and therefore the serial
number on it could not be seized. 132
Similarly, in discussing a traditional plain view seizure of documents,
the Sixth Circuit explained that when officers were only authorized to
search for cocaine, documents that must be read to determine their
incriminating character may not be seized because their incriminating
character was not immediately apparent. 133 This particular requirement
greatly mitigates any concern of a warrant becoming a general search as
a result of the plain view doctrine’s application to digital and electronic
files. 134 For example, a picture of a child in a sexually explicit pose can
be recognized immediately as incriminating and is therefore admissible
under the plain view doctrine. Financial statements or telephone
numbers, however, are not immediately incriminating unless reviewed
further and, thus, cannot be seized and admitted under the plain view
doctrine. 135
One critique regarding this objective, traditional approach relates to
the sheer amount of information stored on computers. This argument
advocates a unique approach to data searches and seizures because a
the privacy protection of the criterion.
127. Ziff, supra note 45, at 869.
128. United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595
(2010).
129. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1987) (holding that the exigency exception allows
officers to enter without a warrant in times of emergency).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 325.
132. Id. at 326–27.
133. United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 510.
134. General searches are exactly what the Founders sought to protect against when ratifying the
Fourth Amendment. Trepel, supra note 1, at 123.
135. Unless, of course, the search warrant specified that these particular items may be seized, or
the seizures are within the scope of the warrant and admissible in context of that warrant.
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significant amount and wide variety of information was not
contemplated by the framers of the Fourth Amendment and is
completely unique to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Nonetheless,
this argument fails because it is merely a statement of fact not a legal
argument. The amount of evidence to be potentially found in a device
that contains evidence has never been taken into consideration by the
Supreme Court. In addition, to assert that computers and digital devices
contain “a lot” of information is an arbitrary distinction. What does “a
lot” or a “large amount” precisely mean for the purposes of Fourth
Amendment legal analysis? Is there some threshold that pushes a
storage device to the point of containing “a lot”? Could this “a lot”
requirement extend to physical file cabinets that hold “a lot” of files?
An “a lot” requirement could logically be extended to the hypothetical
warehouse full of documents. Furthermore, although it is possible for
digital devices to contain significant amounts of information that does
not mean they always do. For example, while a digital camera can store
hundreds of pictures, it often contains a relatively small number of
pictures.
In an area of the law where there are arguably numerous exceptions to
the rule, it is unwise to create further exceptions when current legal
doctrines are easily applied and adequately protect the interests to be
served.
B. Inadvertence Rejected
The inadvertence approach begins with the premise that technology
has created a means of storing information that is so vastly different
from anything else to which the traditional Fourth Amendment rules
have applied that such computer and digital searches and seizures
require special search execution rules. It attempts to remedy the
problems of computer searches by adding the additional requirement of
inadvertence. This requirement permits judges to assess the testimony
of an investigating officer to determine whether he believed he was
acting within the scope of the warrant during the investigation. 136
The first problem with the subjective application of the plain view
doctrine is a legal one—it fails to respect the Supreme Court’s plain
view doctrine precedent. In Horton v. California, the Supreme Court
overruled the inadvertence requirement mentioned in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire stating, “evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by
the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards

136. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 577 (2003).
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that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.” 137
Therefore, adopting this method would require overturning Horton and
restoring the inadvertence requirement that it explicitly rejected. 138
Horton clarifies that the inadvertence requirement fails to accomplish
the goal of preventing police from converting specific warrants into
general warrants. 139 An officer’s subjective intent may be difficult to
discern. 140 If a court relies on an officer’s subjective intent in evaluating
a search or seizure, that officer has an incentive to testify that his
subjective intent was proper, thereby subverting the goal. 141
In addition, a subjective analysis rewards law enforcement for using
untrained officers, who might not know that certain types of evidence
will usually only be found in certain types of computer files, and will
therefore be more likely come across other evidence inadvertently.142
Another approach law enforcement may use is to set specific polices and
standards that mandate very thorough investigations of computer and
digital devices. 143 This is because “[w]hen every step taken by an
analyst is a matter of routine policy, it becomes difficult to exclude
evidence on the ground that the analyst was attempting to circumvent
the warrant.” 144
The most significant problem with the subjective approach of the
plain view doctrine is in its application. It truly offers no greater
protection for privacy against “general” searches and seizures than the
objective approach, but places police officers in a worse position. As
applied by the Seventh Circuit in Mann, all the subjective approach
required was for the officer not to intend to find evidence outside the
scope of the warrant. 145 Determining an individual’s intent is an
onerous task that encourages officers to misrepresent their intentions.
Ultimately, the same type and category of evidence will be seized and
admitted as was seized and admitted in Williams. 146 In the Tenth Circuit
when applying the subjective approach, the plain view doctrine applied
137. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1990). The court also noted the inadvertence
requirement in Coolidge was only for a plurality of Justices.
138. Kerr, supra note 136, at 577.
139. Jim Dowell, Note, Criminal Procedure: Tenth Circuit Erroneously Allows Officers’
Intentions to Define Reasonable Searches: United States v. Carey, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001).
140. Kerr, supra note 136, at 578.
141. Dowell, supra note 139, at 676.
142. Id.
143. Kerr, supra note 136, at 578–79.
144. Id. at 579.
145. See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3525
(2010).
146. See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 595
(2010).
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to the first file opened containing evidence outside the scope of the
warrant because it was discovered inadvertently. 147 The court then
maintained that if the officer continued the search, he could no longer
maintain that subsequent discoveries were inadvertent; however, all the
officer must do is temporarily stop his search and obtain a second
warrant which is virtually guaranteed to be issued because the officer
has viewed evidence of another crime. The only purpose the subjective
approach serves is to inconvenience police officers without any tangible
privacy benefit to suspects.
The subjective approach breaks with firm judicial precedent and does
not resolve any of the problems associated with this area of criminal
procedure.
C. Independent Redaction and Review Rejected
Like the subjective approach, a court’s election to exclude the plain
view doctrine’s application to the seizure of computer and digital data
begins with the premise that these types of searches and seizures are
unique and therefore require a unique application of traditional Fourth
Amendment rules. Like the objective approach, the rule is simple and
easily applied. It permits investigators to conduct whatever search is
necessary with the caveat that only evidence within the scope of the
warrant could be used in court. 148 This alleviates the problem of general
searches because only evidence within the scope of the warrant could be
used in court. 149
Whatever problems this rule might remedy, it also raises two other
important issues: (1) the practical issue that police must ignore what
they find; and (2) the legal issue of providing justification for this type
of approach. Elimination of the plain view doctrine for digital data
seizures means police would lose a valuable tool in gathering evidence
of criminal conduct discovered during a digital property search. As a
consequence, criminals would go unpunished for crimes that may not
have otherwise been discovered, such as in cases of child
pornography. 150 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to allow
individuals to hide their crimes, but rather to protect society from
unreasonable government searches. Proponents of this viewpoint
contend that the draconian nature of this rule is somewhat lessened by
the availability of other traditional Fourth Amendment exceptions,
147.
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including the independent source exception and the inevitable discovery
doctrine. 151 Under these doctrines, evidence can still be admitted if the
government can show that it had some independent source for the same
information or that it would have discovered the same evidence through
other means. 152 From a practical standpoint, however, once officers
view evidence of a crime, they will likely find some other way to obtain
it, using these other Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions artificially.
For example, if child pornography is viewed during a search for
evidence of a drug dealer’s list, officers must “ignore” the evidence.
The officer, however, can swear in an affidavit after the fact that he or
she would have come upon the evidence some other way. As a result,
officers are encouraged to misrepresent themselves, and Fourth
Amendment exceptions are degraded by their artificial application.
In addition, courts applying this approach must articulate legal
justification. Digital property must be legally distinguished from other
types of property in order to justify deviating from the Supreme Court’s
plain view doctrine precedent. 153 As one scholar notes, the Supreme
Court at one time did attempt to distinguish between types of containers
in ranking expectations of privacy. 154 However, a plurality of the court
recognized that this structures analytical “bankruptcy” because it lacked
basis in the language of the Fourth Amendment. 155 Thus, based on the
Supreme Court’s analysis, there is no distinction between the search and
seizure of the contents of a file cabinet and a search and seizure of data
from a computer because Fourth Amendment rules do not distinguish
between different types of storage units.
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the
traditional plain view doctrine’s application because if the court applied
traditional plain view analysis, it would have reached the same result as
it would under independent redaction and review. The officer in this
case had to read the files in order to determine the incriminating nature
of the players’ drug-testing records. The plain view doctrine forbids
seizure of any item not immediately incriminating. As explained by the
Sixth Circuit, if an officer must read a document to determine its
incriminating nature, it may not be lawfully seized under the plain view
doctrine. 156 The plain view doctrine would only permit officers in
Comprehensive Drug Testing to have cursorily viewed the file, allowing
151.
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Kerr, supra note 136, at 584.
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Id. at 528.
Clancy, supra note 37, at 216.
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them to determine that it was not a file involving the players listed in the
warrant. Any search beyond that fails the immediately incriminating
criterion.
The concern regarding general searches in these types of cases does
not stem from the application of the plain view doctrine, but rather, from
the magistrate judge’s failure to appropriately limit the scope of the
search warrant. For example, in Comprehensive Drug Testing, by
permitting a complete search of all electronic files, the magistrate judge
failed to appropriately limit the scope of the search warrant and exposed
to discovery the drug-testing records of players not under investigation.
The search should have been limited in a manner that access was only
granted to the records of those players under investigation. Because the
files being searched were kept in the ordinary course of business, they
were highly unlikely to be mislabeled; therefore, a search warrant for all
computer files was overly broad—a problem which could have been
solved by properly tailoring the warrant. When issuing warrants, judges
must ensure that the warrant’s scope is properly limited.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite confusion in the courts and the fact that computers and digital
devices are used in all aspects of life, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari for both Williams and Mann. While an application of the plain
view doctrine to computers and other digital devices has been
significantly discussed in scholarship for some time, recent circuit court
decisions have brought these “virtual” arguments into reality,
demonstrating a tangible need for the Supreme Court to clarify this
confusion. The most reasonable approach for the Supreme Court to
adopt is the objective application. Although technology changes, the
traditional application of the plain view doctrine continues to properly
balance privacy interests with the government’s interest in effective law
enforcement regardless if law enforcement officials are confronted with
a warehouse full of thousands of documents or a computer full of
millions.
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